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Highlights 
• Meta-analytic review of theory of mind in AN and ASD compared to HCs 
• Performance was worse in AN and ASD relative to HC in all areas of theory of mind 
• Compared to AN, autistic people performed worse on emotional theory of mind 
• Performance in AN and ASD was similar in understanding simple social interactions 
• Performance in AN and ASD was similar in implicit social attribution 
• Potential processes underlying theory of mind profile in AN and ASD are discussed 
 
1 Abstract 
Background: This meta-analytic review examines the theory of mind profiles in both patients 
with anorexia nervosa (AN) and autistic individuals.  
Methodology: The studies examining theory of mind were divided into the following 
categories: emotional theory of mind, understanding simple social situations, understanding 
complex social interactions, and implicit social attribution. All included studies investigated 
differences between healthy control (HCs) individuals and people with AN or autistic people. 
Differences in theory of mind profile between people with AN and autistic people were 
explored by conducting moderator analyses.  
Results: People with AN and autistic people showed a similar theory of mind profile, but 
autistic individuals showed greater difficulties, particularly in emotional theory of mind.   
Conclusions: Although both people with AN and autistic people have significant difficulties in 
all aspects of theory of mind relative to the HCs, some differences in the underlying profile 
may be present. However, due to relative paucity of theory of mind research among people 
with AN, further research is still needed before firm conclusion can be drawn. 
Keywords: theory of mind, autism spectrum disorders, anorexia nervosa 
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2 Introduction 
Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is a life-long developmental condition characterised by 
difficulties with social interaction, repetitive and restricted behaviours and interests, and 
sensory sensitivities (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Approximately 1 in 100 people 
in the UK population are on the autism spectrum (Brugha et al., 2011) with the most recent 
estimates of gender ratios standing at 3:1 male to female (Loomes et al., 2017). The most 
prominent model of autism postulates that autistic individual’s 1  difficulties with social 
cognition centres on theory of mind abilities (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). According to the 
model, autistic people have difficulties with social imagination, particularly in terms of 
understanding that other people have knowledge, thoughts, and motivations which are 
different to their own. This has been supported by a range of studies across the lifespan, 
including child (Colle et al., 2007; Happe, 1994) and adult participants (Baron-Cohen et al., 
2001; Kleinman et al., 2001). Research has also shown that autistic people can have difficulties 
in facial affect recognition and production (Loveland et al., 2008; McIntosh et al., 2006), and 
in emotion recognition (Bal et al., 2010; Kuusikko et al., 2009), both of which are skills which 
play a significant role in our social interactions. 
 
Anorexia nervosa (AN) is a life-threatening eating disorder that typically develops during 
adolescence (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Despite the fact that majority of 
people diagnosed with AN are female, elevated prevalence of comorbid ASD symptoms 
                                                     
1 Identity-first language (i.e., autistic person), opposed to person-first language (i.e., person with autism), is 
preferred by many autistic people and their allies. Therefore, in this article, the authors use predominantly 
identity-first language (Kenny, L., Hattersley, C., Molins, B., Buckley, C., Povey, C., Pellicano, E., 2016. Which 
terms should be used to describe autism? Perspectives from the UK autism community. Autism : the 
international journal of research and practice 20, 442-462.). 
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among people with AN has been recently documented (Bentz et al., 2017a; Huke et al., 2013; 
Vagni et al., 2016; Westwood et al., 2017a; Westwood et al., 2017c). Furthermore, 
experimental studies have reported that people with AN show similar difficulties in social 
cognition as autistic individuals. Recent meta-analytic reviews have shown that people with 
AN have difficulties in reception and production of facial affect (Bora and Kose, 2016; Caglar-
Nazali et al., 2014). However, unlike in ASD, people with AN also show mood congruent, 
negative attentional and interpretation biases that may have some impact on these 
difficulties in social cognition (Ambwani et al., 2016; Cardi et al., 2013). Such biases in 
interpretation could lead to a differential profile in theory of mind in AN relative to ASD. 
Therefore, further investigation of similarities and differences in the social cognition profiles 
in AN and ASD is of interest. 
 
The aim of the present review was to synthesise the existing literature investigating the 
theory of mind profile in autistic individuals and in those with AN. Specifically, we aimed to 
examine understanding of emotions in others, perspective taking, interpretation of social 
behaviour, and intuitive social attribution in these disorders, from early adolescence to 
adulthood. We also aimed to explore whether autistic people were significantly different from 
those with AN in their theory of mind performance.  
 
3 Methods 
3.1 Literature search 
Two literature searches were conducted to identify articles that investigated theory of mind 
among autistic people and among those with AN. The following search terms were used to 
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conduct the first search: (("autism spectrum disorder") OR "Asperger syndrome") AND 
("theory of mind" OR mentalizing OR “Reading the mind in the eyes” OR “reading the mind in 
the voice” OR “reading the mind in the video”). The second search was conducted using the 
search terms ("anorexia nervosa") AND ("theory of mind" OR mentalizing OR “Reading the 
mind in the eyes” OR “reading the mind in the voice” OR “reading the mind in the video”). In 
accordance with the PRISMA guidelines (Moher et al., 2009), the following electronic 
databases were used to conduct the literature searches: Pubmed, Scopus, Web of Knowledge, 
and OVID (PsycINFO, PsycARTICLES, MEDLINE, AGRIS, Embase). Additionally, the 
bibliographies of all included papers and related review articles were screened for any 
additional papers that were not found through the initial searches.  
 
3.2 Eligibility criteria 
To be included in the review the studies were required to 1) include a sample of adults or 
adolescents aged 12 years or older with a diagnosis of ASD, Asperger’s Disorder (AS), high 
functioning autism (HFA), or AN; 2) include an age-matched healthy comparison (HC) group; 
3) assess theory of mind; 4) have at least ten participants in each group. Only studies assessing 
explicit theory of mind were included, and any studies using tasks in which theory of mind 
ability was inferred from eye movements or reaction times were excluded. Studies in which 
only young children took part were not included as AN is often diagnosed in early adolescence 
or later, and thus comparing young children with ASD and AN would not be possible. 
Additionally, studies that used self-report questionnaires or parental report measures to 
assess theory of mind were not included; nor were studies that used tasks that produced 
error rates, such as the Penny Hiding Game, because the outcome measure had the opposite 
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direction compared to other included tasks making statistical comparisons difficult. To reduce 
heterogeneity in the sample, studies that assessed theory of mind during functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) or positron emission tomography were not included. This was done 
because the tasks often need to be substantially amended to be used in such contexts, making 
comparisons with behavioural versions of similar tasks difficult.  Finally, we used the following 
definition of theory of mind by Frith and Frith (2005):  Theory of mind refers to the ability 
infer information about others’ emotions, intentions, knowledge, and beliefs from social 
interaction or given information. Therefore, we did not include studies that only investigated 
recognition of basic emotions, but studies that required the identification of complex 
emotions or emotional mental states, such as frustration, were included.   
 
3.3 Study selection 
The study selection and screening flow charts are presented in Figures 1A,B. The literature 
search and initial screening of the articles based on title and abstract was conducted by two 
of the authors. Inclusion of papers following initial screening was decided by the whole team 
in consensus meetings. If there was any uncertainty about inclusion of certain articles they 
were brought to the whole team for further discussion.  
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 Figure 1. Study selection flow charts 
A. The study selection flow chart of studies investigating theory of mind in autism spectrum 
disorders. B. The study selection flow chart of studies investigating theory of mind in anorexia 
nervosa. 
 
 
After initial screening, 101 full text articles investigating theory of mind in ASD were assessed 
for eligibility (Figure 1A). After this screening, five articles were excluded because we were 
unable to obtain an English language version of the papers, and nine articles were excluded 
for being conference abstracts. After further screening four publications were excluded for 
collecting theory of mind data during an fMRI scan, four papers were excluded for reporting 
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error rates or inferring theory of mind from reaction times, and another three were excluded 
for including a sample of less than ten participants. Fourteen papers did not report the 
relevant data in the text or supplementary materials, and the corresponding authors of these 
papers were contacted to gain access to the data. One author, White et al. (2014), provided 
data via personal correspondence. Finally, 63 articles investigating the theory of mind profile 
in ASD were included in the review.  
 
Following initial screening, 29 papers investigating theory of mind in people with AN were 
assessed further (Figure 1B). Two papers were excluded because we were unable to obtain 
an English language version of the paper, and another three were excluded because they 
were conference abstracts. One paper was excluded because the task involved assessing 
theory of mind used specifically in interactions with the participants’ parents and was thus 
deemed to be too specific and another was excluded for including the same sample as a 
previous study from the same group. One paper did not provide the relevant data in the text 
or supplementary materials, but the corresponding author, Harrison et al. (2010b), provided 
the data through personal correspondence. The final sample included 22 papers that were 
included in the review. 
 
 
3.4 Data collection and synthesis 
In addition to sample sizes, means and standard deviations from the theory of mind tasks 
were extracted from the included studies. If a study reported standard errors, standard 
deviations were estimated with the following formula: 𝑆𝐷 = 𝑆𝐸 ∗  √𝑁. The extracted data 
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was used to calculate standardised mean differences between the patient and HC samples, 
which were then entered into four separate meta-analyses exploring the theory of mind 
profile in individuals with ASD or AN. To explore any potential between-study heterogeneity, 
additional data regarding age, the IQ of the patient group, the proportion of male participants 
in the sample, and the type of tasks used to assess theory of mind was extracted.  
 
 
3.5 Theory of mind tasks 
The theory of mind tasks used in each study are summarised in Table 1. A wide range of 
different tasks were used to assess theory of mind and these tasks were divided into four 
separate categories representing different aspects of theory of mind: emotional theory of 
mind, understanding of simple social interactions, understanding of complex social 
interactions, and implicit social attribution. . The tasks were categorised according to 
methodological similarities as judged by the authors. 
 
3.5.1 Emotional theory of mind tasks 
Forty-four studies used the Reading the Mind in the Eyes task (RMET) to assess emotional 
theory of mind (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997b). In the RMET participants are presented with 
images of eyes and are then asked to identify the emotion or complex mental state the eyes 
are trying to convey by selecting the appropriate response from four options presented on 
the screen. Five studies used adapted versions of the same task, the Reading the Mind in the 
Voice task (RMVT) or the Reading the Mind in the Film task (RMFT) (Golan et al., 2006; 
Rutherford et al., 2002). In these tasks participants are presented with a short verbal or film 
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excerpt, and are asked to identify the emotion that is being conveyed in a similar manner to 
the RMET. Two studies used the Levels of Emotional Awareness Scale (LEAS), in which 
participants are presented with short scenarios to assess their awareness of their own and 
other’s emotions (Lane et al., 1990). Another two studies used the Emotions category of the 
Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition (MASC), in which participants are presented 
with short films and asked to identify the emotion the characters in the films are portraying 
(Dziobek et al., 2006a).  Additional measures used to assess emotional theory of mind 
included the Arena of Emotions (AoE) (Rosenblau et al., 2015) and the emotions subscale of 
the Animated Theory of Mind test (A-ToM) (Schaller and Rauh, 2017), which are similar to the 
MASC, and the Computerised Theory of Mind test (C-ToM) (Shamay-Tsoory, 2008), which was 
based on the RMET but also utilised gaze direction. The theory of mind score was calculated 
from the number of correct responses. 
 
3.5.2 Understanding of simple social interactions 
Tasks that were grouped into the understanding of simple social interactions category all 
assessed participants’ accuracy of detecting mistakes in given social scenarios or stories. 
Thirteen studies used the Faux Pas test to assess understanding of simple social interactions 
(Gregory et al., 2002; Stone et al., 1998). The task involves participants reading stories and 
detecting whether the characters commit social faux pas or mistakes. Nine studies used a 
similar story task, the False Belief test, in which participants were asked about the characters’ 
false beliefs due to changing social situations (Baron Cohen, 1985; Baron-Cohen, 1989). Other 
tasks used to assess understanding of simple social interactions included the theory of mind 
subscale of the Developmental NEuroPSYchological Assessment (NEPSY-II) (Korkman, 2007a, 
b), the cognitive subscale of the A-ToM (Schaller and Rauh, 2017), the Hint Task (Corcoran et 
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al., 1995), a Theory of Mind Scale (Wellman and Liu, 2004), and the Dewey Story Test (DST) 
(Dewey, 1998), all of which assessed understanding of other’s perspectives and false beliefs. 
In each task participants were asked to answer either multiple-choice or open-ended 
comprehension questions after each scenario. The answers were either scored correct or 
incorrect and the theory of mind score was calculated from the number of correct responses. 
 
3.5.3 Understanding of complex social interactions 
The tasks that were grouped into the understanding of complex social interactions category 
involved more than spotting simple social faux pas or mistakes. The tasks included 
understanding of sarcasm, jokes, white lies, double bluff, and other types of non-literal social 
interaction. Fifteen studies used the Strange Stories Task (SST) to assess understanding of 
complex social interactions (Happe, 1994) and six studies used the full MASC to assess 
understanding of various types of social scenarios (Dziobek et al., 2006a). The other tasks 
used to assess understanding of complex social interactions included the complex interaction 
subscale of the C-ToM task (Shamay-Tsoory, 2008), Cartoons, Commercials, various types of 
stories, the Social cognition and object relation (SCORS) task (Westen, 1995), and the 
Awareness of Social Inference Test (TASIT) (McDonald et al., 2003), all of which assessed 
participants’ ability to understand complex social interactions. In all tasks the scenarios were 
followed by either multiple-choice or open-ended comprehension questions. In tasks other 
than the SST, participants’ answers were either scored correct or incorrect and the theory of 
mind score was a sum of the number of correct responses. In the SST participants’ responses 
to the open-ended questions could also be scored as partially correct if they gave some 
indication of understanding the character’s thoughts, emotions, or mental states. The 
participants’ answers were scored 2 if they were correct, 1 if they were partially correct, and 
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0 if they were incorrect, and the final theory of mind scores from the SST was a sum of the 
scores from each story. 
 
3.5.4 Implicit social attribution 
Ten studies used the Smith-Happé animations (SHA), four studies used Happé’s cartoons, and 
another two studies used the Social Attribution Task (SAT) to assess implicit social attribution 
(Abell et al., 2000; Heider and Simmel, 1944; Klin, 2000). Other tasks used to assess implicit 
social attribution included cartoons, the narrative version of the Projective Imagination Test 
(PIT), the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT), and a reading task (Blackshaw et al., 2001; 
Murray, 1943). All tasks required participants to provide verbal descriptions of the stimuli 
they were given and the number of theory of mind terms used in descriptions formed the 
theory of mind score. The SHA task could also involve participants categorising the videos into 
three separate categories representing random movements, simple interactions, and 
complex interactions between the stimuli. In these studies, the number of correct 
categorisations formed the theory of mind score. Despite of the multiple-choice aspect of this 
task, it is believed to assess implicit social attribution because of the nature of the stimuli, 
which consist of silent videos showing complex interactions between two triangles.  
 
 
3.6 Statistical analysis 
All statistical analyses were conducted with R (R Core Team, 2015). Unbiased Hedges’ g effect 
size estimates (Hedges, 1981), along with 95% confidence intervals were calculated to 
estimate differences between the patient and HC groups in theory of mind. The effect size 
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estimates were interpreted as small ( 0.20), medium ( 0.50), and large ( 0.80) (Hedges, 
1981).  
 
The user-contributed package Metafor was used to conduct all statistical analyses including 
meta-analyses, meta-regressions, and publication bias analyses (Viechtbauer, 2010). Because 
some of the studies included more than one measure of theory of mind or compared two 
different groups of patients against the same control group, multivariate random effects 
meta-analyses were conducted using the rma.mv function. The multivariate meta-analysis 
accounts for the covariance that arises from the same sample being entered into the analysis 
more than once, allowing for investigation into differences between various measures of 
theory of mind.  
 
Cochran’s Q and I2 statistics were calculated to examine between-study heterogeneity. To 
examine if studies with autistic people and people with AN were significantly different from 
each other when compared to a HC group, a moderator analysis with the diagnostic group 
(ASD, AN) was conducted. Additionally, where significant between-study heterogeneity was 
present, meta-regressions were conducted with the following moderators: study quality 
score, age, the type of task used, and estimated IQ of the patient group. All moderators were 
entered into the same model to investigate the impact of each on the heterogeneity while 
holding other moderators constant. If any moderators were highly correlated with each other 
they were automatically dropped from the meta-regression.  
 
The presence of bias was explored by examining each study using the Study Quality 
Assessment Tool for Case-Control Studies developed by the United States National Institute 
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of Health. Two authors, J.L. and F.S. independently assessed each study using the tool and 
rater agreement was calculated. If both raters gave a study a poor rating, that is the study 
failed to meet three or more of the criteria, it was excluded from any subsequent analysis. If 
there was any substantial disagreement between the raters, the study causing the 
disagreement was brought to the whole team for further assessment. Study quality scores, 
proportion of criteria met, were then calculated for each study and included in the 
subsequent meta-regressions. Standardised residuals and Cook’s distance values of each 
study were computed to investigate if any study was substantially different from the others 
and thus, a potential outlier. Any study with the z-score of the standardised residual over 1.96 
and Cook’s distance over 1, was inspected further (Cook and Weisberg, 1982; Viechtbauer 
and Cheung, 2010) The presence of publication bias in each meta-analysis The presence of 
publication bias was explored by conducting Begg’s rank correlation test of funnel plot 
asymmetry (Begg and Mazumdar, 1994). 
 
 
4 Results 
4.1 Study characteristics 
The main characteristics of each study are summarised in Table 1. The SMD column 
represents the effect size estimate of the difference between the patient and HC groups in 
theory of mind performance in each study. Positive effect sizes indicate that the AN/ASD 
group performed better than the HC group, while negative effect sizes indicate that the HC 
group outperformed the AN/ASD group.  
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Table 1. Characteristics of studies investigating theory of mind in AN and ASD. 
Study Group N; 
N males 
(BMI) 
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI] 
Baron-Cohen et al. 
(1997a) 
HFA/AS = 16  
males = 13 
28.6 (9.7) WAIS-R = 105.31 (13.0) RMET (old version) -1.47 [-2.08, -0.85] 
 
HC = 50  
males = 25 
 
 
30.0 (9.12) 
 
 
Not measured 
Baron-Cohen et al. 
(1997c) 
HFA/AS = 16  
males = 13 
28.6 (9.7) FSIQ = 105.31 (13.0) RMET -1.36 [-2.13, -0.59] 
 
HC = 16  
males = 13 
 
30.0 (9.12) 
 
NART = 100.0 (10.0) 
Baron-Cohen et al. 
(2001) 
HFA/AS = 15  
males = 15 
29.7 (14.5) WAIS-R = 115.0 (16.1) RMET -1.69 [-2.53, -0.84] 
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Study Group N; 
N males 
(BMI) 
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI] 
 
HC = 14  
males = 14 
 
28.0 (9.0) 
 
WAIS-R = 116.0 (6.4) 
Baron-Cohen et al. 
(2015) 
ASD (M) = 178  
males = 178 39.88 (11.56) 
NR RMET -0.34 [-0.56, -0.13] 
 
HC (M) = 152  
males = 152 37.70 (12.62) 
 
NR 
ASD (F) = 217  
males = 0 39.88 (11.80) 
NR RMET -0.69 [-0.89, -0.48] 
 
HC (F) = 168  
males = 0 39.15 (10.82) 
 
NR 
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Study Group N; 
N males 
(BMI) 
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI] 
Beaumont and 
Newcombe (2006) 
HFA/AS = 20 
 males = 16 
27.7 (12.9) NART = 107.8 (8.1) TAT -0.42 [-0.72, -0.12] 
HC = 20  
males = 16 
27.7 (11.9) NART = 106.1 (8.7) Commercials -0.85 [-1.50, -0.21] 
Begeer et al. (2010) HFA = 34  
males = 26 
16.0 (4.0) WISC-III 
108.5 (21.1) 
Reading task -0.77 [-1.27, -0.28] 
 
HC = 34  
males = 27 
 
16.0 (3.0) 
 
WISC-III = 105.8 (18.3) 
Beversdorf et al. 
(1998) 
ASD = 10  
males = 7 
30.8 (9.3) WAIS-R = 109.7 (16.2) FBT -0.91 [-1.77, -0.04] 
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Study Group N; 
N males 
(BMI) 
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI] 
HC = 13  
males = 8 
30.6 (12.8) WAIS-R = 117.3 (11.2) 
Blackshaw et al. 
(2001) 
AS = 25  
males = 20 
22.7 (6.8) NART = 93.33 (11.5) PIT -0.75 [-1.38, -0.12] 
 
HC = 18  
males = 7 
 
31.39 (7.85) 
 
NART = 109.5 (10.7) 
Bowler (1992) AS = 15  
males = 13 
26.7 (8.4) WAIS = 86.8 (11.4) FBT -0.46 [-1.19, 0.26] 
 
HC = 15  
males = 7 
 
NR 
 
Not measured 
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Study Group N; 
N males 
(BMI) 
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI] 
Brewer et al. (2017) ASD = 163  
males = 113 
27.0 (11.8) WASI-II: PRI = 108.7 (13.5) 
WASI-II: VCI = 103.0 (15.0) 
FPT -0.60 [-0.88, -0.33] 
SST -0.73 [-1.00, -0.45] 
HC = 80  
males = 24 
26.1 (10.2) WASI-II: PRI = 106.4 (12.1) 
WASI-II: VCI = 111.2 (13.9) 
SHA -0.24 [-0.47, -0.01] 
Brown and Klein 
(2011)  
HFA/AS = 16  
male:female = 3:1 
25.8 (7.9) WAIS: vocabulary score = 12.56 
(3.1) 
SAT -1.28 [-1.91, -0.66] 
 
HC = 16  
male:female = 3:1 
 
26.6 (7.0) 
 
WAIS: vocabulary score = 14.19 
(2.7) 
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Study Group N; 
N males 
(BMI) 
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI] 
Brunsdon et al. (2015) ASD = 181  
male:female = 4.48:1 
13.49 (0.69) WASI = 90.0 (20.3) FBT -0.52 [-0.76, -0.29] 
HC = 160  
male:female = 2.20:1 
12.79 (1.10) WASI = 101.9 (15.1) SHA -0.24 [-0.92, 0.44] 
Callenmark et al. 
(2014) 
ASD = 19  
males = 13 
15.1 (1.6) WISC/WAIS: vocabulary = 8.8 
(2.6) 
DST -0.66 [-1.31, -0.001] 
 
HC = 19  
males = 13 
 
15.3 (1.7) 
 
WISC/WAIS: vocabulary = 8.8 
(2.6) 
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Study Group N; 
N males 
(BMI) 
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI] 
Craig et al. (2004) AS = 17  
males = 15 
24.1 (6.7) NART = 104.8 (7.1) RMET -1.42, [-2.19, -0.66] 
HC = 16  
males = 11 
19.4 (8.4) NART = 110.3 (9.9) Hint task -1.60 [-2.38, -0.81] 
Crane et al. (2013) ASD = 28  
males = 14 
41.6 (16.5) WASI = 117.2 (13.5) SST -0.58 [-1.11, -0.04] 
 
HC = 28  
males = 14 
 
40.5 (17.2) 
 
WASI = 115.1 (11.7) 
Demurie et al. (2011) ASD = 13  
males = 12 
14.4 (1.2) TIQ = 101.5 (11.6) 
VIQ = 98.0 (11.9) 
RMET -0.90 [-1.65, -0.15] 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
Study Group N; 
N males 
(BMI) 
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI] 
PIQ = 105.2 (14.3) 
 
HC = 18  
males = 14 
 
13.9 (1.7) 
 
Not measured 
(Dziobek et al., 2006a) AS = 21  
males = 19 
41.6 (10.4) WAIS = 112.0 (6.1) RMET -1.50 [-2.19, -0.81] 
SST -0.77 [-1.42, -0.12] 
HC = 20  
males = 18 
39.9 (12.6) WAIS = 124.0 (6.3) 
MASC -2.24 [-3.04, -1.44] 
Dziobek et al. (2006b) AS = 17  
males = 14 
41.4 (9.9) WAIS-R = 113.0 (6.0) MASC - Emotions -1.70 [-2.48, -0.91] 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
Study Group N; 
N males 
(BMI) 
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI] 
HC = 17  
males = 15 
40.2 (13.0) WAIS-R = 115.0 (5.0) MASC - Total 
 
-2.31 [-3.18, -1.45] 
Flood et al. (2011) AS = 26  
males = 22 
13.5 (1.4) NR SST -0.70 [-1.28, -0.13] 
 
HC = 24  
males = 19 
 
13.3 (1.1) 
 
NR 
Golan et al. (2006) ASD = 22  
males = 17 
29.0 (9.8) WASI = 114.2 (10.8) RMFT -1.30 [-1.95, -0.65] 
 
HC = 22  
males = 18 
 
25.4 (9.5) 
 
WASI = 116.5 (11.0) 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
Study Group N; 
N males 
(BMI) 
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI] 
Golan et al. (2007) HFA/AS = 50  
males = 40 
27.5 (8.5) WASI = 113.8 (11.5) RMET -1.16 [-1.69, -0.63] 
HC = 22  
males = 17 
24.3 (7.7) WASI = 114.5 (9.9) RMVT -1.34 [-1.88, -0.80] 
Gonzalez-Gadea et al. 
(2013) 
AS = 23  
males = 15 
33.0 (9.8) WAT = 37.4 RMET -0.13 [-0.72, 0.46] 
HC= 21  
males = 11 
38.2 (14.4) WAT = 37.1 FPT -1.34 [-1.99, -0.69] 
Grainger et al. (2014) ASD = 18  
males = 13 
29.0 (10.3) WASI = 112.3 (15.0) SHA -0.83 [-1.44, -0.23] 
 
HC = 18  
males = 11 
 
30.4 (14.6) 
 
WASI = 114.9 (10.5) 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
Study Group N; 
N males 
(BMI) 
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI] 
Heavey et al. (2000) ASD = 16  
males = 15 
34.7 (9.5) WAIS-R = 89.6 (11.7) SST -1.55 [-2.36, -0.75] 
HC = 15  
males = 15 
30.7 (8.1) WAIS-R = 95.5 (14.7) AMT -1.72 [-2.55, -0.90] 
Jolliffe and Baron-
Cohen (1999) 
AS/ASD = 34  
males = 30 
29.2 (7.8) WAIS-R = 106.1 (13.9) SST -1.53 [-2.18, -0.88] 
 
HC = 17  
males = 15 
 
30.0 (9.1) 
 
WAIS-R = 106.4 (12.7) 
Kleinman et al. (2000) ASD = 24  
males = 21 
31.4 (8.3) NR RMET -0.61 [-1.19, -0.03] 
HC = 24  
males = 10 
22.3 (5.8) NR RMVT -1.29 [-1.91, -0.66] 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
Study Group N; 
N males 
(BMI) 
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI] 
Klin (2000) HFA/AS = 40  
males = NR 
19.7 (11.3) WAIS = 96.8 (23.3) SAT -1.56 [-1.83, -1.30] 
 
HC = 20  
males = NR 
 
20.2 (7.4) 
 
WAIS = 103.1 (18.0) 
Kristen et al. (2014) ASD = 20 
males = 15 
28.3 (11.6) Culture-Free IQ = 100.8 (22.1) RMET -0.65 [-1.29, -0.02] 
HC = 20  
males = 14 
29.3 (11.1) Culture-Free IQ = 103.9 (14.1) SST -1.21 [-1.88, -0.53] 
Lahera et al. (2014) AS = 22  
males = 18 
21.9 (6.7) NR RMET -1.64 [-2.30, -0.99] 
MASC -1.34 [-1.97, -0.72] 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
Study Group N; 
N males 
(BMI) 
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI] 
HC = 26  
males = 17 
22.9 (4.8) NR SST -1.63 [-2.28, -0.97] 
Lai et al. (2012) ASD (M) = 32  
males = 32 
27.0 (7.2) Full IQ = 113.7 (15.1) RMET -0.87 [-1.38, -0.36] 
 
HC (M) = 32  
males = 32 
 
 
28.7 (5.9) 
 
Full IQ = 116.3 (11.8) 
ASD (F) = 32  
males = 0 
28.1 (8.2) 
 
Full IQ = 114.1 (15.5) RMET -1.13 [-1.65, -0.60] 
 
HC (F) = 32  
males = 0 
 
27.6 (6.3) 
 
Full IQ = 119.7 (8.4) 
Lehnhardt et al. (2011) HFA = 39  31.1 (8.9) Full IQ = 127.9 (13.2) RMET -0.98 [-1.45, -0.51] 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
Study Group N; 
N males 
(BMI) 
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI] 
males = 25 
 
HC = 39  
males = 25 
 
31.2 (8.1) 
 
Full IQ = 133.3 (11.6) 
Lever and Geurts 
(2015) 
ASD = 118  
males = 83 
47.6 (14.9) WAIS: vocabulary = 114.8 (16.9) FPT -0.41 [-0.67, -0.15] 
 
HC = 118  
males = 83 
 
47.7 (15.4) 
 
WAIS: vocabulary = 114.3 (15.3) 
(Lind et al., 2014) HFA = 27  
males = 21 
35.5 (13.2) WASI = 112.4 (16.4) SHA -0.62 [-1.26, 0.02] 
 
HC = 29  
 
33.3 (16.2) 
 
WASI = 114.1 (11.0) 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
Study Group N; 
N males 
(BMI) 
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI] 
males = 22 
Lombardo et al. (2007) ASD = 30  
males = 23 
29.1 (7.4) WASI = 117.2 (13.1) RMET -0.60 [-1.11, -0.08] 
 
HC = 30  
males = 23 
 
29.9 (78) 
 
WASI = 117.1 (8.7) 
Lugnegard et al. 
(2013) 
AS = 53  
males = 26 
27.3 (4.1) WAIS: vocabulary = 10.4 (2.3) RMET -0.28 [-0.67, 0.10] 
HC = 50  
males = 19 
28.8 (9.3) WAIS: vocabulary = 9.9 (2.1) SHA -0.57 [-1.33, 0.19] 
Marsh and Hamilton 
(2011) 
HFA/AS = 18  
males = NR 
33.0 (10.9) WAIS: Verbal = 112.9 (16.6) SHA -0.76 [-1.52, -0.01] 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
Study Group N; 
N males 
(BMI) 
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI] 
WAIS: Performance = 104.4 
(18.0) 
 
HC = 19  
males = NR 
 
32.2 (10.1) 
 
WAIS: Verbal = 112.5 (13.8) 
WAIS: Performance = 113.4 
(13.9) 
Martin and McDonald 
(2004) 
AS = 14  
males = 13 
19.6 (1.7) WAIS-III: vocabulary = 10.4 (3.3) PIT -0.94 [-1.64, -0.25] 
 
HC = 24  
males = 14 
 
19.8 (3.4) 
 
WAIS-III: vocabulary = 12.8 (2.7) 
Martinez et al. (2017) ASD = 19  
males = 15 
22.7 (4.1) WAIS = 108.6 (16.9) MASC -1.73 [-2.12, -1.33] 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
Study Group N; 
N males 
(BMI) 
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI] 
 
HC = 20  
males = 17 
 
23.4 (3.6) 
 
WAIS = 108.9 (11.0) 
Muller et al. (2016) ASD = 33  
males = 27 
15.6 (1.9) WISC = 101.1 (14.4) RMET -0.37 [-0.91, 0.16] 
 
HC = 23  
males = 14 
 
16.3 (2.4) 
 
WISC = 109.8 (15.1) 
MASC -0.87 [-1.43, -0.31] 
Murray et al. (2017) ASD = 20  
males = 20 
30.6 (6.5) WAIS: verbal = 105.1 (17.0) RMET -0.53 [-1.26, 0.01] 
SST -0.61 [-1.24, 0.03] 
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CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
Study Group N; 
N males 
(BMI) 
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI] 
HC = 20  
males = 19 
30.7 (6.3) WAIS: verbal = 112.3 (11.5) SHA -0.79 [-1.33, -0.25] 
Oakley et al. (2016) ASD = 19 
males = 14 
30.9 (11.9) WASI = 108.5 (11.7) MASC  
HC (alexithymia-
matched) = 24 
males = 15 
30.1 (12.2) WASI = 109.8 (15.7) RMET -0.10 [-0.70, 0.51] 
Pedreno et al. (2017) HFA = 35  
males = 34 
18.6 (6.4) WAIS-III/WISC = 100.0 (15.6) RMET -0.62 [-1.10, -0.14] 
FPT -0.78 [-1.26, -0.29] 
HC = 35  
males = 34 
19.4 (6.2) WAIS-III/WISC = 115.2 (10.7) 
SST -1.10[-1.61, -0.60] 
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Study Group N; 
N males 
(BMI) 
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI] 
Robinson et al. (2017) ASD = 24  
males = 20 
14.0 (25.1) WASI = 104.3 (11.8) RMET -0.64 [-1.22, -0.06] 
 
HC = 24  
males = 20 
 
14.0 (25.3) 
 
WASI = 103.6 (9.9) 
Rosenblau et al. 
(2015) 
ASD = 28  
males = 18 
33.1 (8.5) MWT = 113.0 (16.4) AoE -0.88 [-1.46, -0.30] 
 
HC = 23  
males = 17 
 
32.4 (8.9) 
 
MWT = 108.0 (12.9) 
RMET -0.72 [-1.29, -0.16] 
Rutherford et al. 
(2002) 
HFA/AS = 19  
males = 17 
29.0 (14.5) WAIS = 107.9 (12.7) RMVT -1.02 [-1.69, -0.36] 
   
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
Study Group N; 
N males 
(BMI) 
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI] 
HC = 20  
males = 17 
36.0 (10.7) WAIS = 101.0 (7.3) 
Samson and Hegenloh 
(2010) 
AS = 19  
Males = 47.4% 
27.8 (8.3) NR Cartoons -0.78 [-1.28, -0.29] 
 
HC = 109 
males = 38.5% 
 
25.0 (5.7) 
 
NR 
Sato et al. (2017) ASD = 19  
males = 14 
28.1 (9.0) WAIS = 112.3 (13.7) RMET -0.89 [-1.55, -0.22] 
 
HC = 19  
males = 14 
 
23.3 (3.8) 
 
WAIS = 114.8 (7.0) 
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CE
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Study Group N; 
N males 
(BMI) 
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI] 
Schaller and Rauh 
(2017) 
ASD = 23  
males = 23 
15.7 (1.3) Full IQ = 105.7 (11.5) RMET -1.17 [-1.80, -0.53] 
A-ToM (recognition 
of emotions being 
conveyed) 
-0.70 [-1.30, -0.10] 
A-ToM (recognition 
of false beliefs) 
-0.87 [-1.48, -0.26] 
HC = 22  
males = 22 
15.9 (1.0) Full IQ = 103.8 (11.1) FBT -0.41 [-1.00, 0.18] 
MASC 
 
-0.78 [-1.38, -0.17] AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
Study Group N; 
N males 
(BMI) 
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI] 
Schneider et al. (2013) HFA = 18  
males = 15 
27.8 WASI = 112.6 ToM Scale -0.66 [-1.35, 0.03] 
HC = 16  
males = 13 
31.2 WASI = 113.9 SST -0.61 [-1.30, 0.08] 
Schuwerk et al. (2015) ASD = 18  
males = 12 
24.1 (7.0) MWT = 104.3 (18.0) 
Culture-Fair IQ = 91.4 (21.7) 
RMET -1.18 [-1.88, -0.49] 
HC = 19  
males = 13 
25.3 (3.8) MWT = 102.5 (11.9) 
Culture-Fair IQ = 98.3 (18.3) 
SST -0.29 [-0.94, 0.36] 
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Study Group N; 
N males 
(BMI) 
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI] 
Segura et al. (2015) ASD = 21  
males = 20 
19.7 (7.8) WAIS = 102.0 (11.0) RMET -0.53 [-1.30, 0.23] 
FPT -0.41 [-1.17, 0.35] 
HC = 10  
males = 10 
18.2 (1.4) WAIS = 110.0 (10.0) 
SST -1.07 [-1.87, -0.27] 
Senju et al. (2009) AS = 19  
males = NR 
36.8 (14.3) WAIS-III = 115.6 (14.9) FBT -0.52 [-1.18, 0.15] 
 
HC = 17  
males = NR 
 
39.6 (11.7) 
 
WAIS-III = 115.3 (11.0) 
SST -0.25 [-0.90, 0.41] AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
Study Group N; 
N males 
(BMI) 
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI] 
Shamay-Tsoory (2008) HFA/AS = 18  
males = 17 
21.9 (6.3) NR C-ToM (cognitive 
theory of mind) 
-0.77 [-1.42, -0.12] 
HC = 21  
males = 15 
23.4 (6.3) NR C-ToM (recognition 
of fortune in others, 
e.g. gloating) 
-0.78 [-1.44, -0.13] 
Spek et al. (2010) HFA/AS = 61  
males = 52 
42.9 (10.7) WAIS = 112.4 (15.4) FPT -0.76 [-1.20, -0.32] 
 
HC = 32  
 
38.7 (9.3) 
 
WAIS = 115.9 (10.0) 
SST -0.26 [-0.69, 0.17] 
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CE
PT
ED
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IPT
Study Group N; 
N males 
(BMI) 
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI] 
males = 24 
Torralva et al. (2013) AS = 25  
males = 72% 
33.9 (11.1) NR RMET -0.37 [-0.89, 0.14] 
 
HC = 36  
males = 60% 
 
36.4 (9.9) 
 
NR 
FPT -1.44 [-2.01, -0.87] 
White et al. (2011) ASD = 16  
males = 12 
33.0 (10.3) WAIS: Verbal = 111.3 (12.7) 
WAIS: Performance = 106.4 
(12.8) 
FBT 
 
-0.81 [-1.54, -0.08] 
SST -1.16 [-1.92, -0.40] 
HC = 15  36.5 (9.9) WAIS: Verbal = 114.1 (12.0) 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
Study Group N; 
N males 
(BMI) 
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI] 
males = 11 WAIS: Performance = 110.5 
(13.7) 
SHA -1.06 [-1.45, -0.67] 
White et al. (2014) ASD = 22  
males = 19 
13.5 WISC: Verbal = 110.5 
WISC: Performance = 99.0 
FBT -0.83 [-1.58, -0.07] 
 
HC = 11 
males = 10 
 
14.3 
 
WISC: Verbal = 118.0 
WISC: Performance = 103.0 
Wilson et al. (2014) ASD = 89  
males = 89 
26.0 (7.0) Verbal IQ = 110.0 (14.0) RMET -0.98 [-1.29, -0.67] 
FBT 0.09 [-0.21, 0.38] 
HC = 89  
males = 89 
28.0 (6.0) Verbal IQ = 109.0 (13.0) 
SHA -0.72 [-1.39, -0.06] 
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ED
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IPT
Study Group N; 
N males 
(BMI) 
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI] 
Zalla et al. (2009) AS = 15  
males = NR 
28.0 (7.0) WAIS-III = 114.8 (16.7) FPT -1.71 [-2.55, -0.88] 
 
HC = 15  
males = NR 
 
27.8 (4.5) 
 
WAIS-III = 115.3 (14.6) 
Zalla and Leboyer 
(2011) 
HFA = 20  
males = 16 
27.6 (6.7) WAIS = 93.5 (22.4) FPT -0.69 [-1.28, -0.10] 
 
HC = 28  
males = 21 
 
27.9 (7.6) 
 
WAIS = 97.7 (12.9) 
Zalla et al. (2015) HFA/AS = 19  
males = 16 
28.8 (7.1) WAIS-III = 96.3 (19.8) FPT -1.36 [-2.07, -0.66] 
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CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
Study Group N; 
N males 
(BMI) 
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI] 
HC = 19  
males = 15 
26.4 (6.1) WAIS-III = 101.2 (7.5) 
Zalla et al. (2016) ASD = 21  
males = NR 
35.4 (14.5) Full IQ = 101.7 (18.8) FPT -0.96 [-1.59, -0.32] 
 
HC = 21  
males = NR 
 
31.4 (13.6) 
 
Full IQ = 102.8 (14.3) 
Yeh et al. (2010) HFA/AS = 32  
males = 22 
13.1 (2.4) WISC = 94.7 (11.8) FBT -0.75 [-1.24, -0.25] 
FPT -0.96 [-1.46, -0.44] 
HC = 34  
males = 23 
12.8 (0.7) WISC = 93.4 (7.6) 
SST -0.76 [-1.26, -0.26] 
AC
CE
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ED
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IPT
Study Group N; 
N males 
(BMI) 
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI] 
Adenzato et al. (2012) AN = 30  
males = 0 
BMI = 15.1 (1.7) 
19.73 (6.0) NR RMET -0.37 [-0.87, 0.13] 
 
HC = 32  
males = 0 
BMI = 20.5 (2.7) 
 
20.2 (1.5) 
 
NR 
Bentz et al. (2017a) AN = 28  
males = 0 
BMI = 16.6 (1.2) 
16.1 (1.5) RIAS = 107.7 (10.5) RMET 0.42 [-0.06, 0.91] 
SHA 0.10 [-0.38, 0.58] 
HC = 41 
males = 0 
BMI = 22.0 (2.6) 
17.7 (2.2) RIAS = 107.3 (9.5) 
TASIT 0.14 [-0.29, 0.57] 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
Study Group N; 
N males 
(BMI) 
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI] 
AN-REC = 43  
males = 0 
BMI = 21.3 (1.8) 
18.4 (1.6) RIAS = 102.8 (11.5) RMET 
 
 
SHA -0.05 [-0.48, 0.38] 
HC = 41 
males = 0 
BMI = 22.0 (2.6) 
17.7 (2.2) RIAS = 107.3 (9.5) 
TASIT -0.30 [-0.78, 0.18] 
Brockmeyer et al. 
(2016) 
AN = 25  
males = 0 
BMI = 15.3 (1.2) 
23.7 (5.6) NR MASC – emotions 
 
 
-0.63 [-1.19, -0.06] 
HC = 25  
males = 0 
BMI = 21.8 (1.8) 
24.6 (2.3) NR MASC – total -0.40 [-0.96, 0.16] 
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CE
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IPT
Study Group N; 
N males 
(BMI) 
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI] 
Calvo Sagardoy et al. 
(2014)  
AN (adolescent) = 21  
males = NR 
BMI = 17.3 (11.2) 
14 – 18 NR RMET -0.21 [-0.78, 0.36] 
 
HC (adolescent) = 28  
males = NR 
BMI = 21.8 (17.9) 
 
14 – 18 
 
NR 
AN (adult) = 27 
 males = NR 
BMI = 17.3 (11.2) 
19 – 50 NR RMET -0.61 [-1.29, 0.06] 
 
HC (adult) = 13  
males = NR 
 
19 – 50 
 
NR 
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Study Group N; 
N males 
(BMI) 
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI] 
BMI = 21.8 (17.9) 
Gal et al. (2011) AN = 20  
males = NR 
BMI = 16.5 (2.3) 
15.5 (2.0) NR FPT -0.61 [-1.24, 0.03] 
HC = 20  
males = NR 
BMI = 20.0 (2.9) 
15.4 (2.0) NR FBT -0.52 [-1.15, 0.11] 
Gillberg et al. (2010) AN-WR = 42  
males = NR 
BMI = 22.4 (4.6) 
32 WAIS-III = 99.4 (14.3) SHA -0.46 [-0.89, -0.04] 
 
HC = 46  
males = 0 
 
32 
 
WAIS-III = 104.1 (11.1) 
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CE
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IPT
Study Group N; 
N males 
(BMI) 
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI] 
BMI = 23.4 (4.2) 
Harrison et al. (2009) AN = 20  
males = 0 
BMI = 15. 8 (1.2) 
26.3 (5.7) NART = 114.5 (4.6) RMET -1.18 [-1.85, -0.51] 
 
HC = 20  
males = 0 
BMI = 21.8 (1.6) 
 
28.4 (8.5) 
 
NART = 114.9 (5.8) 
Harrison et al. (2010b) AN = 48  
males = 0 
BMI = 15.4 (1.8) 
26.7 (9.8) NART = 11.4 (8.6) RMET -0.51 [-0.87, -0.15] 
 
HC = 48  
 
28.5 (9.9) 
 
NART = 113.3 (7.4) 
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CE
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ED
 M
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IPT
Study Group N; 
N males 
(BMI) 
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI] 
males = 0 
BMI = 21.6 (1.9) 
Jermakow and 
Brzezicka (2016) 
AN = 10  
males = 0 
BMI = 14 – 22 
26.8 (4.3) NR RMET 0.49 [-0.20, 1.18] 
 
HC = 33  
males = 0 
BMI = NR 
 
21.3 (1.4) 
 
NR 
Kanakam et al. (2013) AN = 24  
males = 0 
BMI = NR 
NR NR RMET -0.32 [-0.82, 0.19] 
   
AC
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AN
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IPT
Study Group N; 
N males 
(BMI) 
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI] 
HC = 42  
males = 0 
BMI = NR 
NR NR 
Kucharska et al. (2016) AN = 25  
males = 0 
BMI = 17.6 (2.2) 
27.1 (6.3) NR RMET -0.21 [-0.77, 0.34] 
 
HC = 25  
males = 0 
BMI = 23.4 (3.6) 
 
24.5 (5.2) 
 
NR 
Laghi et al. (2015) AN = 40  
males = 0 
BMI = 15.8 (1.5) 
14.9 (1.4) NR RMET 0.15 [-0.29, 0.59] 
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Study Group N; 
N males 
(BMI) 
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI] 
 
HC = 40  
males = 0 
BMI = 21.9 (2.6) 
 
14.9 (0.6) 
 
NR 
Leppanen et al. 
(2017a) 
AN = 30  
males = 0 
BMI = 16.3 (3.0) 
26.2 (6.8) Not measured RMET 0.58 [0.06, 1.10] 
 
HC = 29  
males = 0 
BMI = 23.2 (3.7) 
 
26.8 (8.5) 
 
Not measured 
Medina-Pradas et al. 
(2012) 
AN = 44  
males = 0 
26.8 (9.9) NR RMET -0.75 [-1.20, -0.31] 
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Study Group N; 
N males 
(BMI) 
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI] 
BMI = 15. 8 (1.7) 
 
HC = 39  
males = 0 
BMI = 21.3 (2.1) 
 
26.0 (14.7) 
 
NR 
Oldershaw et al. 
(2010) 
AN = 40  
males = 3 
BMI = 16.6 (1.3) 
27.3 (10.0) NART = 107.5 (11.2) RMET -0.53 [-1.00, -0.06] 
RMVT -0.73 [-1.20, -0.25) 
RMFT -0.74 [-1.22, -0.27] 
HC = 47 
males = 10 
BMI = 23.0 (2.8) 
29.8 (8.0) NART = 112.5 (7.9) 
LEAS -0.36 [-0.82, 0.11] 
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Study Group N; 
N males 
(BMI) 
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI] 
Postorino et al. (2017) AN = 30  
males = 0 
BMI = NR 
14.2 (1.6) Full IQ = 105.0 (15.0) NEPSY-II -0.67 [-1.19, -0.15] 
 
HC = 30  
males = 0 
BMI = NR 
 
13.6 (1.6) 
 
Full IQ = 106.0 (13.0) 
Rommel et al. (2013) AN = 25  
males = 0 
BMI = 14.8 (1.7) 
19.9 (3.1) NR LEAS -0.22 [-0.73, 0.29] 
 
HC = 37  
males = 0 
 
20.5 (3.0) 
 
NR 
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Study Group N; 
N males 
(BMI) 
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI] 
BMI = 20.4 (2.5) 
Rothschild-Yakar et al. 
(2010) 
AN = 34  
males = 0 
BMI = 16.5 (2.4) 
18.2 (2.7) NR SCORS -1.14 [-1.65, -0.63] 
 
HC = 35  
males = 0 
BMI = 20.1 (2.1) 
 
17.8 (2.3) 
 
NR 
Russell et al. (2009) AN = 22  
males = 0 
BMI = 15.3 (1.2) 
26.7 (4.8) NART = 118.3 (3.0) Cartoons -1.94 [-2.67, -1.21] 
 
HC = 20  
 
30.3 (6.5) 
 
NART = 119.2 (2.1) 
RMET -1.34 [-2.01, -0.67] 
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Study Group N; 
N males 
(BMI) 
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI] 
males = 0 
BMI = 16.2 (2.0) 
Tapajoz Pereira De 
Sampaio et al. (2013b) 
AN = 24  
males = 0 
BMI = 18.1 (1.8) 
24.5 (7.6) Full IQ = 102.5 (19.8) RMET -1.14 [-1.75, -0.53] 
HC = 24  
males = 0 
BMI = 21.5 (1.8) 
25.2 (6.9) Full IQ = 100.2 (15.2) FPT -0.81 [-1.40, -0.22] 
Tapajoz Pereira De 
Sampaio et al. (2013a) 
AN = 22 
males = 0 
BMI = 18.1 (2.8) 
24.3 (7.6) Word Accentuation Test = 101.4 
(20.4) 
RMET -1.21 [-1.83, -0.58] 
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Study Group N; 
N males 
(BMI) 
Age IQ Task SMD [95% CI] 
HC = 24 
males = 0 
BMI = 21.5 (1.8) 
25.2 (6.9) Word Accentuation Test = 100.2 
(15.2) 
FPT -0.72 [-1.32, -0.13] 
Tchanturia et al. 
(2004) 
AN = 20  
males = 0 
BMI = 15.8 (2.2) 
27.4 (7.9) NR Stories (similar to 
SST) 
-0.68 [-1.32, -0.04] 
HC = 20  
males = 0 
BMI = 21.5 (1.5) 
28.3 (7.4) NR Cartoons -0.58 [-1.22, 0.05] 
ASD = autism spectrum disorder; AS = Asperger’s Disorder; HFA = high functioning autism; AN = anorexia nervosa; EDNOS = Eating Disorder Not 
Otherwise Specified; AN-REC = Recovered from anorexia nervosa; AN-WR = Weight restored people with anorexia nervosa; F = female; M = 
male; AoE = Arena of Emotions; A-ToM = Animated Theory of Mind test; C-ToM = Computerised Theory of Mind test; MASC – Emotions = 
Emotions category of the Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition; RMET = Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test; RMFT = Reading the Mind 
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in the Film Test; RMVT = Reading the Mind in the Voice Test; Levels of Emotional Awareness Scale; AMT = Awkward Moments Test; A-ToM = 
Animated Theory of Mind test; DST = Dewey Story Test; FBT = False Belief Test; FPT = Faux Pas Test; ToM Scale = Theory of Mind Scale; NEPSY-
II = A Developmental NEuroPSYchological Assessment second edition; MASC = Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition; PIS = Pragmatic 
Interpretation Stories; SST = Strange Stories Test; SCORS = Social Cognition and Object Relation; TASIT = The Awareness of Social Inference 
Test; PIT = Projective Imagination Test; SAT = Social attribution Test; SHA = Smith-Happé Animations; TAT = Thematic Apperception Test; IQ = 
intelligence quotient; WAIS(-R) = Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (revised); FSIQ = Full Scale Intelligence Quotient; NART = National Adult 
Reading Test; WISC  = Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children; WASI = Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence; TIQ = Total Intelligence 
Quotient; VIQ = Verbal Intelligence Quotient; Performance Intelligence Quotient; MWIT = Mehrfachwahl-Wortschatz-Intelligenz test; WAT = 
Word accentuation test; RIAS = Reynolds Intellectual Assessment Scales; NR = not reported. 
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4.2 Study quality assessment 
The study quality assessment results are shown in Supplementary Table 1. Interrater 
reliability was acceptable (88.2 %) and no study met the criteria for exclusion. Only ten studies 
provided some sample size justification, indicating that majority of the studies may have been 
inadequately powered.  
 
 
4.3 Emotional theory of mind 
The standardised residuals and Cook’s distance of each study included in the meta-analysis 
are presented in Supplementary Table 2 and Supplementary Figure 1 respectively. The Z 
scores of the standardised residuals of three studies (Bentz et al., 2017a; Jermakow and 
Brzezicka, 2016; Leppanen et al., 2017a) exceeded 1.96, but the corresponding Cook’s 
distance values were less than 0.11 and did not exceed the cut off. Therefore, the studies 
were not deemed to be influential outliers and were included in the meta-analysis.  
 
The differences between healthy individuals and those with ASD and AN in performance on 
the emotional theory of mind tasks are presented in Figure 2 and 3, respectively. Due to the 
large number of studies, the results are presented in two figures to allow for better 
visualisation. The meta-analysis revealed that relative to the HCs, the AN/ASD groups 
performed significantly worse with a medium effect size (g = -0.69, z = -9.60, p < 0.0001, 95% 
CI [-0.83, -0.55]). When the two diagnostic groups were inspected separately there was a 
significant difference between people with ASD and the HCs with a large effect size (g = -0.84, 
z = -11.61, p < 0.0001, 95% CI [-0.98, -0.69]) and a small, significant difference between people 
with AN and the HCs (g = -0.41, z = -3.09, p = 0.002, 95% CI [-0.67, -0.15]).  
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 There was also significant between-study heterogeneity (I2 = 76.23%, Q = 184.07, p < 0.0001), 
which was explored further with a meta-regression. The meta-regression did not explain a 
significant portion of the heterogeneity (Qmoderators = 16.58, p = 0.121), leaving significant, 
unexplained residual heterogeneity (Qresidual = 52.41, p = 0.002). The final model was formed 
of the following moderators: the diagnostic group (Z = -0.33, p = 0.739, 95% CI [-0.86,0.61], 
the percentage of males in the sample (Z = -0.01, p = 0.994, 95% CI [-0.83, 0.82]), age (Z = -
0.98, p = 0.329, 95% CI [-0.05, 0.02]), the IQ of the patient group (Z = -0.48, p = 0.635, 95% CI 
[-0.05, 0.03]), the A-ToM task (Z = 1.33, p = 0.183, 95% CI [-0.22, 1.18]), the LEAS  (Z = 0.97, p 
= 0.330, 95% CI [-0.30, 0.89]), the emotions subscale of the MASC (Z = -0.62, p = 0.535, 95% 
CI [-1.61, 0.89]), the RMET (Z = 0.44, p = 0.662, 95% CI [-0.37, 0.58]), the RMFT (Z = -0.34, p = 
0.736, 95% CI [-0.69, 0.49]), the RMVT (Z = -0.31, p = 0.754, 95% CI [-0.64, 0.46]), and the 
quality assessment score (Z = -0.67, p = 0.506, 95% CI [-3.52, 1.74]).   
 
Begg’s rank correlation test of funnel plot asymmetry suggested there was significant 
publication bias present (τ = -0.32, p = 0.0003; Supplementary Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2. Emotional theory of mind in ASD. 
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 ASD = autism spectrum disorder; AS = Asperger’s Disorder; HFA = high functioning autism; F 
= female; M = male; AoE = Arena of Emotions; A-ToM = Animated Theory of Mind test; C-ToM 
= Computerised Theory of Mind test; MASC – Emotions = Emotions category of the Movie for 
the Assessment of Social Cognition; RMET = Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test; RMFT = 
Reading the Mind in the Film Test; RMVT = Reading the Mind in the Voice Test; SMD = 
standardised mean difference; CI = Confidence interval. 
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Figure 3. Emotional theory of mind in AN. 
 
AN = anorexia nervosa; EDNOS = Eating Disorder Not Otherwise Specified; Levels of Emotional 
Awareness Scale; MASC – Emotions = Emotions category of the Movie for the Assessment of 
Social Cognition; RMET = Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test; RMFT = Reading the Mind in the 
Film Test; RMVT = Reading the Mind in the Voice Test; SMD = standardised mean difference; 
CI = Confidence interval. Calvo Sagardoy et al. (2014) A = adolescent participants; Calvo 
Sagardoy et al. (2014) B = adult participants. 
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 4.4 Understanding of simple social interactions 
The standardised residuals and Cook’s distance of each study are presented in Supplementary 
Table 3 and Supplementary Figure 3 respectively. The Z score of a standardised residual of 
one study (Wilson et al., 2014) exceeded 1.96, but the Cook’s distance of the study was 0.07 
and did not exceed 1. Therefore, the study was not deemed to be an influential outlier and 
was not removed from analysis.  
 
 
The differences between healthy individuals, autistic people and people with AN in 
understanding of simple social interactions are presented in Figure 4. The meta-analysis 
showed that the AN/ASD groups performed significantly worse the HCs with a medium effect 
sizes (g = -0.76, z = -9.63, p < 0.0001, 95% CI [-0.92, -0.61]). Both the ASD and AN group 
performed more poorly than the HCs with moderate effect sizes (ASD: g = -0.79, z = -8.52, p 
< 0.0001, 95% CI [-0.97, -0.61]; AN: g = -0.69, z = -4.75, p < 0.0001, 95% CI [-0.97, -0.40]). 
 
The meta-analysis also revealed significant between-study heterogeneity (I2 = 65.56%, Q = 
70.51, p < 0.0001), which was explored further with a meta-regression. The meta-regression 
explained a significant portion of the between-study heterogeneity (Qmoderator = 44.92, p < 
0.0001), leaving no significant residual heterogeneity (Qresidual = 4.29, p = 0.933). The final 
model was formed of the following moderators: the diagnostic group (Z = -2.22, p = 0.027, 
95% CI [-1.94, -0.12]), the percentage of males in the sample (Z = 2.30, p = 0.022, 95% CI [0.17, 
2.12], age (Z = 0.64, p = 0.524, 95% CI [-0.01, 0.01]), the IQ of the diagnostic group (Z = -0.64, 
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p = 0.520, 95% CI [-0.04, 0.02]), the AMT (Z = -1.75, p = 0.080, 95% CI [-1.98, 0.11]), the Hint 
task (Z = -1.02, p = 0.306, 95% CI [-1.43, 0.45]), the NEPSY-II (Z = 0.87, p = 0.383, 95% CI [-0.48, 
1.25]), and the ToM Scale (Z = 1.05, p = 0.293, 95% CI [-0.42, 1.38]), the FBT (Z = 1.74, p = 
0.082, 95% CI [-0.05, 0.91]), the FPT (Z = 0.70, p = 0.486, 95% CI [-0.35, 0.74]), and the quality 
assessment score (Z = 3.35, p = 0.001, 95% CI [1.44, 5.50]). The effect appeared to be largely 
driven by the percentage of males in the sample, diagnostic group, and by the quality 
assessment scores. Studies with autistic participants, fewer males, and lower quality 
assessment scores appeared to show the largest differences between the diagnostic and 
control groups. However, since there were fewer studies that included AN participants or 
primarily females, and the variance in the quality assessment scores was very small, this 
finding should be interpreted with caution.    
 
Begg’s rank correlation test for funnel plot asymmetry indicated that significant publication 
bias was present (τ = -0.26, p = 0.041; Supplementary Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4. Understanding of simple social interactions in ASD and AN. 
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 ASD = autism spectrum disorder; AS = Asperger’s Disorder; HFA = high functioning autism; AN 
= anorexia nervosa; AMT = Awkward Moments Test; A-ToM = Animated Theory of Mind test; 
DST = Dewey Story Test; FBT = False Belief Test; FPT = Faux Pas Test; ToM Scale = Theory of 
Mind Scale; NEPSY-II = A Developmental NEuroPSYchological Assessment second edition; 
SMD = standardised mean difference; CI = Confidence interval. 
 
 
4.5 Understanding of complex social interactions 
The standardised residuals and Cook’s distance of each study are presented in Supplementary 
Table 4 and Supplementary Figure 5 respectively. The Z scores of standardised residuals of 
four studies (Bentz et al., 2017a; Dziobek et al., 2006a; Dziobek et al., 2006b; Martinez et al., 
2017) exceeded 1.96, but the Cook’s distance values of the two studies were less than 0.27 
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and did not exceed 1. Thus, these studies were not deemed to be influential outliers and were 
not excluded from analysis.  
 
 
The differences between healthy individuals, and autistic people and people with AN in 
understanding of complex social interactions are presented in Figure 5. Overall, the AN/ASD 
groups were significantly poorer in comprehending complex social interaction than the 
healthy individuals with a large effect size (g = -0.89, z = -10.12, p < 0.0001, 95% CI [-1.06, -
0.71]). When inspected separately, the ASD and AN groups performed poorer than healthy 
individuals with a large and medium effect sizes, respectively (ASD: g = -0.94, z = -10.55, p < 
0.0001, 95% CI [-1.12, -0.77; AN: g = -0.54, z = -2.18, p = 0.029, 95% CI [-1.03, -0.06]).  
 
There was significant between-study heterogeneity (I2 = 67.14%, Q = 105.57, p < 0.0001), 
which was explored further. The meta-regression significantly explained a portion of the 
heterogeneity (Qmoderator = 19.13, p = 0.004), but there was still significant residual 
heterogeneity (Qresidual = 40.14, p = 0.0002). The final model consisted of the following 
moderators: the percentage of males in the sample (Z = -0.79, p = 0.427, 95% CI [-2.62, 1.11]), 
age (Z = -1.65, p = 0.099, 95% CI [-0.08, 0.01]), the IQ of the patient group (Z = 1.33, p = 0.184, 
95% CI [-0.02, 0.09]), the Commercials task (Z = -0.33, p = 0.742, 95% CI [-1.27, 0.90]), the 
MASC task (Z = -4.15, p < 0.0001, 95% CI [-1.45, -0.52]), and the quality assessment score (Z = 
0.21, p = 0.833, 95% CI [-4.39, 5.45]). The moderator affect appeared to be largely driven by 
the MASC task, the studies that used this task showed the largest differences between the 
diagnostic and control groups.  
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Begg’s rank correlation test of funnel plot asymmetry showed significant evidence of 
publication bias (τ = -0.33, p = 0.006; Supplementary Figure 6).  
 
Figure 5. Understanding of complex social interactions in ASD and AN. 
 
ASD = autism spectrum disorder; AS = Asperger’s Disorder; HFA = high functioning autism; AN 
= anorexia nervosa; AN-REC = Recovered from anorexia nervosa; C-ToM = Computerised 
Theory of Mind test; MASC = Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition; PIS = Pragmatic 
Interpretation Stories; SST = Strange Stories Test; SCORS = Social Cognition and Object 
Relation; TASIT = The Awareness of Social Inference Test; SMD = standardised mean 
difference; CI = Confidence interval.  
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4.6 Implicit social attribution 
The standardised residuals and Cook’s distance of each study is presented in Supplementary 
Table 5 and Supplementary Figure 7, respectively. The Z score of the standardised residual of 
one study (Russell et al., 2009) exceeded 1.96, but the Cook’s distance was 0.23 and did not 
exceed 1. Therefore, the study was not deemed an influential outlier and was not removed 
from further analysis. 
 
The differences between healthy individuals, and autistic people and people with AN in 
implicit social attribution are presented in Figure 6. Overall, the AN/ASD groups performed 
more poorly on the tasks than the healthy individuals with a medium effect size (g = -0.74, z 
= -6.33, p < 0.0001, 95% CI [-0.97, -0.51]). When the groups were inspected separately, both 
performed more poorly than the HCs in the social attribution tasks with large and medium 
effect sizes (ASD: g = -0.80, z = -6.47, p < 0.0001, 95% CI [-1.00, -0.54]; AN: g = -0.70, z = -1.75, 
p = 0.080, 95% CI [-1.49, 0.08]). However, the difference between people with AN and HCs 
did not reach significance.  
 
There was significant between-study heterogeneity (I2 = 79.28, Q = 92.81, p < 0.0001), which 
was explored further. The meta-regression did not explain a significant portion of the 
heterogeneity (Qmoderator = 14.99, p = 0.091), but left no significant residual heterogeneity 
(Qresiduals = 3.96, p = 0.138). The final model consisted of the following moderators: the 
diagnostic group (Z = 0.40, p = 0.690, 95% CI [-3.74, 5.64]), the percentage of males (Z = -0.83, 
p = 0.406, 95% CI [-3.12, 1.26]), age (Z = -0.76, p = 0.449, 95% CI [-0.22, 0.10]), the IQ of the 
patient group (Z = -0.16, p = 0.877, 95% CI [-0.08, 0.07]), the PIT (Z = 0.16, p = 0.870, 95% CI [-
4.77, 5.64]), the Reading task (Z = 0.08, p = 0.933, 95% CI [-5.32, 5.79]), the SHA  task (Z = 0.79, 
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p = 0.431, 95% CI [-1.80, 4.22]), the TAT (Z = 0.66, p = 0.509, 95% CI [-2.57, 5.19]), and the 
quality assessment score (Z = -0.18, p = 0.859, 95% CI [-7.70, 6.42]).. 
 
Begg’s rank correlation test did not reveal evidence of significant publication bias (τ = -0.08, 
p = 0.679; Supplementary Figure 8).  
 
Figure 6. Implicit social attribution in ASD and AN. 
 
ASD = autism spectrum disorder; AS = Asperger’s Disorder; HFA = high functioning autism; AN 
= anorexia nervosa; AN-REC = Recovered from anorexia nervosa; AN-WR = Weight restored 
people with anorexia nervosa; PIT = Projective Imagination Test; SAT = Social attribution Test; 
SHA = Smith-Happé Animations; TAT = Thematic Apperception Test; SMD = standardised 
mean difference; CI = Confidence interval.  
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5 Discussion 
The aim of the present review was to examine the theory of mind profile in autistic people as 
well as in people with AN. The majority of the available studies included autistic individuals, 
and it became clear that areas other than emotional theory of mind have been relatively 
under-researched in AN. The meta-analyses showed that autistic people and people with AN 
have similar theory of mind profiles. Although both diagnostic groups performed more poorly 
in the theory of mind tasks than HC individuals, autistic people appeared to have more 
difficulties than those with AN. This finding suggests that there are a number of similarities 
between autistic people and people with AN in social cognition, but there may also be some 
differences that warrant further investigation. 
 
The effect size estimates suggested that there may be some differences between people with 
AN and autistic people in emotional theory of mind even though the diagnostic group did not 
emerge as a significant moderator of between-study heterogeneity.  People with AN showed 
significant difficulties in emotional theory of mind relative to healthy individuals, but these 
difficulties appeared to be less severe compared to autistic people. This finding is in line with 
a recent suggestion that people with AN may have greater difficulties with implicit responses 
to emotional cues, including response and interpretation biases, rather than in explicit 
labelling (Adenzato et al., 2012; Cardi et al., 2013; Cardi et al., 2017; Davies et al., 2016; 
Harrison et al., 2011; Harrison et al., 2010a; Leppanen et al., 2017b; Mendlewicz et al., 2005). 
Indeed, a recent experimental study reported that although people with AN had some 
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difficulties in recognising disgust, this may have been driven by a bias towards interpreting 
this facial affect as anger (Dapelo et al., 2016). Conversely, a recent meta-analytic review 
documented that autistic people display difficulties in recognition of basic emotions with 
small to large effect sizes (Uljarevic and Hamilton, 2013). Moreover, experimental work has 
demonstrated that even after correcting for response biases, autistic people show general 
difficulties in the explicit detection of emotions (Evers et al., 2015). Taken together, these 
findings suggest that people with AN and autistic people may have different difficulties in 
processing and responding to emotional cues.  
 
People with AN and autistic individuals showed similar performance on measures of 
understanding simple and complex social interactions as well as in implicit social attribution, 
even though the AN group did not do significantly worse on social attribution than the HCs. 
The present findings are supported by previous work showing that both people with AN and 
autistic people report elevated social anhedonia and have similar neuropsychological 
processing profiles (Chevallier et al., 2012a; Chevallier et al., 2012b; Harrison et al., 2014; 
Tchanturia et al., 2012; Westwood et al., 2017b). Further support comes from the notion that 
these processes could be influenced by participants’ understanding of the implicit social rules 
that guide behaviour in social situations (Baez et al., 2012; Jameel et al., 2015; Kipps and 
Hodges, 2006; Zalla et al., 2009). Interestingly, previous work has documented that autistic 
people have a good understanding of explicit social rules, but struggle when rules are abstract 
or implicit, or when the spontaneous application of existing rules is needed (Baez et al., 2012; 
Myles et al., 2001). Similarly, there has been some suggestion that although semantic 
understanding of social rules may be intact in AN, when these rules are embedded into social 
scenarios the picture becomes complex and people with AN have difficulties detecting when 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
rules are broken (Bentz et al., 2017b). Taken together, these findings suggest that 
spontaneous application of social rules to abstract stimuli may be similarly affected in AN and 
ASD.  
 
It is of interest that people with AN appeared to have somewhat less severe difficulties in 
both understanding of social interactions, relative to autistic people. Although this finding 
could be driven by the relative paucity of research examining these processes in people with 
AN, it could also indicate that there may be differences in the underlying processes between 
these two groups and further research is needed. Indeed, recent behavioural findings suggest 
that people with AN do not show difficulties in abstract thinking in general, including 
understanding or explaining the meaning of non-literal abstract concepts and proverbs (Bentz 
et al., 2017b). It seems that people with AN have difficulties understanding non-literal 
communication specifically when it appears in a social context (Rothschild-Yakar et al., 2010; 
Tchanturia et al., 2004). Conversely, difficulties with understanding abstract, non-literal 
concepts, such as metaphors and proverbs, is a recognised feature of ASD regardless of 
context and is likely related to more general difficulties in language processing (Boucher, 
2012; Ganz and Flores, 2009; Olofson et al., 2014; Tager-Flusberg and Caronna, 2007). Taken 
together, it may be that people with AN and autistic people have differential difficulties in 
understanding non-literal social interactions and implicit attribution of social understanding. 
However, further research, particularly studies examining these processes in AN, is still 
needed before firm conclusions can be drawn. 
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6 Limitations and future directions 
The main limitation of the present review is that we were not able to directly compare 
performance on theory of mind tasks between autistic individuals and people with AN due to 
a lack of studies. Instead, the two groups were compared by first calculating SMD comparing 
the AN/ASD group against a HC group, and then conducting a meta-regression. This sets some 
limits on the conclusions that can be drawn from this review as it is difficult to detect any 
subtle differences in theory of mind performance between the two diagnostic group through 
this method. Thus, the present findings highlights the need for further research to examine 
the theory of mind profiles in these related disorders, particularly in the light of the subtle 
differences observed in the effect size estimated between the two group in emotional theory 
of mind and understanding of simple social interactions. Further research into similarities and 
potential differences in the theory of mind profiles between people with AN and autistic 
individuals could help to further the understanding of the underlying aetiology in both 
disorders.  
 
Another limitation is that there were substantially fewer studies investigating theory of mind, 
especially understanding of social interactions and social attribution, in people with AN. This 
shows that theory of mind is a relatively under-researched area compared to work focusing 
on eating related behaviours, which has been the traditional focus in the eating disorder 
literature.  The present review shows that further research into theory of mind in AN is 
warranted, especially in the light of theoretical models that highlight the role of social 
cognition in the development and maintenance of disordered eating (Treasure and Schmidt, 
2013). This means that when diagnostic group was entered as a moderator in the meta-
regressions the number of studies that included autistic people and those that included 
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people with AN were not balanced. Such unbalances could have influenced the results of the 
present meta-regressions could have impacted the results. Therefore, further research with 
more complex tasks is still needed to provide a clear picture of the theory of mind profile in 
AN. 
 
The meta-analyses also revealed significant between-study heterogeneity, which could be 
partly explained by differences between the diagnostic groups, in the tasks used, in the 
average age of the sample, in the proportion of males in the sample, and in the IQ of the 
patient group. Some studies using specific tasks, such as the MASC, reported significantly 
greater differences between the diagnostic and control groups than other studies. Further 
examination of the subtle differences between the tasks may be of interest for future studies 
to establish whether there may be more fine grained differences in the aspects of theory of 
mind measured in these tasks. This also suggests that future studies may benefit from greater 
consistency in the tasks used, which would provide a clearer picture of the theory of mind 
profile in both ASD and AN.  
 
Disentangling the impact of gender, age, and IQ on the between-study heterogeneity is more 
difficult. Although they contributed to a significant model, they did not individually 
significantly explain the heterogeneity. However, the present review does show that majority 
of the studies investigating theory of mind in autistic adolescents and adults included a large 
number of male participants with only few females. The studies that investigated theory of 
mind in people with AN, on the other hand, primarily included only female participants. 
Additionally, majority of the studies included in the present review recruited adults between 
the ages of 18 and 35. A few studies included adolescents under the age of 18 and no studies 
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included older adults. Similarly, majority of the studies included participants with average or 
above average IQ. This gender, age, and IQ  imbalance could be a potential source of between-
study heterogeneity.  
 
 
Interestingly, in three of the meta-analyses a combination of these factors at least partially 
explained the between-study heterogeneity, while in one of the meta-analyses we were 
unable to identify the source of the heterogeneity. Although we were unable to identify the 
source of the unexplained heterogeneity, it is possible that variability in the patient groups 
could have had an impact. Twelve studies reported that they included mixed groups of people 
with Asperger’s syndrome, high-functioning ASD, and low-functioning ASD. Additionally, as 
starvation is believed to have substantial impact on social and cognitive functioning in AN 
(Keys et al., 1950), it is of importance to note that the majority of the studies in the present 
review included only underweight AN participants. Although two studies included AN 
participants who were weight restored or recovered, it is not possible to ascertain that theory 
of mind difficulties in AN are not at least partly due to the impact of malnutrition on the brain. 
Indeed, a systematic review of social-emotional processing in AN across illness stage reported 
that those recovered from AN had fewer difficulties in emotional awareness in self and others 
(Oldershaw et al., 2011). However, some difficulties, such as implicit attentional bias towards 
negative social cues, appeared to persist after recovery from AN (Oldershaw et al., 2011). 
Moreover, we were not able to examine the potential confounding impact of mood and 
anxiety on performance on the theory of mind tasks. This would be an important factor to 
examine further, particularly as people with AN and autistic individuals report significantly 
higher levels of depression and anxiety relative to the general population (Oldershaw et al., 
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2011). Additionally, people with mood and anxiety disorders show altered performance on a 
number of tasks assessing social-cognition, including theory of mind (Oldershaw et al., 2011). 
Future studies may benefit from further exploring the impact of these variables on theory of 
mind in ASD and AN. 
 
In the meta-analysis that examined emotional theory of mind, majority of the studies used 
the RMET or a variation of the task. This task has recently been criticised for being an emotion 
recognition task rather than a theory of mind task (Oakley et al., 2016). This makes it difficult 
to determine if poorer performance in this task is due to difficulties in theory of mind or due 
difficulties such as alexithymia (Oakley et al., 2016). The RMET has also been criticised for 
using non-naturalistic, static images restricted to the eye region and for using multiple-choice 
format, which has been suggested to increase bias in the accuracy scores (Johnston et al., 
2008). However, these criticisms are true of a number of other paradigms as well, such as the 
C-ToM. Therefore, although the studies that used the RMET did not emerge as significant 
moderators of between-study heterogeneity, future studies may benefit from using 
alternative, more ecologically valid tasks to assess emotional theory of mind. 
 
Finally, all meta-analyses revealed significant publication bias according to Begg’s test of 
funnel plot asymmetry. This is an important limitation of the present review as it suggests 
that many small studies reported larger effect sizes than larger studies. This can be an 
indication of inflated effect sizes in small studies, which would lead to bias in the pooled effect 
size estimates (Zhang et al., 2013). Therefore, more larger studies are needed to gain a clear 
picture of theory of mind profiles in both ASD and AN. 
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7 Conclusions 
The present review examined the theory of mind profile in ASD and AN. The majority of the 
studies included autistic individuals indicating relative paucity of research in AN. Overall, 
autistic people and those with AN appeared to have similar difficulties in all aspects of theory 
of mind. However, there was some indication of potential group differences in emotional 
theory of mind. Autistic people showed greater difficulties in task performance and further 
investigation of potential differences between autistic people and individuals with AN would 
be of interest. These findings are supported by previous work demonstrating that there are 
similarities in certain aspects of social emotional and neurocognitive processing between 
individuals with AN and autistic people. Further research investigating the processes that 
underlie theory of mind difficulties in both AN and ASD would be of interest.  
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10 Figure legends 
Figure 1. Study selection flow charts. A. The study selection flow chart of studies investigating 
theory of mind in autism spectrum disorders. B. The study selection flow chart of studies 
investigating theory of mind in anorexia nervosa. 
 
Figure 2. Emotional theory of mind in ASD. 
ASD = autism spectrum disorder; AS = Asperger’s Disorder; HFA = high functioning autism; F 
= female; M = male; AoE = Arena of Emotions; A-ToM = Animated Theory of Mind test; C-ToM 
= Computerised Theory of Mind test; MASC – Emotions = Emotions category of the Movie for 
the Assessment of Social Cognition; RMET = Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test; RMFT = 
Reading the Mind in the Film Test; RMVT = Reading the Mind in the Voice Test; SMD = 
standardised mean difference; CI = Confidence interval. 
 
Figure 3. Emotional theory of mind in AN. 
AN = anorexia nervosa; EDNOS = Eating Disorder Not Otherwise Specified; Levels of Emotional 
Awareness Scale; MASC – Emotions = Emotions category of the Movie for the Assessment of 
Social Cognition; RMET = Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test; RMFT = Reading the Mind in the 
Film Test; RMVT = Reading the Mind in the Voice Test; SMD = standardised mean difference; 
CI = Confidence interval. Calvo Sagardoy et al. (2014) A = adolescent participants; Calvo 
Sagardoy et al. (2014) B = adult participants. 
 
Figure 4. Understanding of simple social interactions in ASD and AN. 
ASD = autism spectrum disorder; AS = Asperger’s Disorder; HFA = high functioning autism; AN 
= anorexia nervosa; AMT = Awkward Moments Test; A-ToM = Animated Theory of Mind test; 
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DST = Dewey Story Test; FBT = False Belief Test; FPT = Faux Pas Test; ToM Scale = Theory of 
Mind Scale; NEPSY-II = A Developmental NEuroPSYchological Assessment second edition; 
SMD = standardised mean difference; CI = Confidence interval. 
 
 
Figure 5. Understanding of complex social interactions in ASD and AN. 
ASD = autism spectrum disorder; AS = Asperger’s Disorder; HFA = high functioning autism; AN 
= anorexia nervosa; AN-REC = Recovered from anorexia nervosa; C-ToM = Computerised 
Theory of Mind test; MASC = Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition; PIS = Pragmatic 
Interpretation Stories; SST = Strange Stories Test; SCORS = Social Cognition and Object 
Relation; TASIT = The Awareness of Social Inference Test; SMD = standardised mean 
difference; CI = Confidence interval.  
 
Figure 6. Implicit social attribution in ASD and AN. 
ASD = autism spectrum disorder; AS = Asperger’s Disorder; HFA = high functioning autism; AN 
= anorexia nervosa; AN-REC = Recovered from anorexia nervosa; AN-WR = Weight restored 
people with anorexia nervosa; PIT = Projective Imagination Test; SAT = Social attribution Test; 
SHA = Smith-Happé Animations; TAT = Thematic Apperception Test; SMD = standardised 
mean difference; CI = Confidence interval.  
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